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The court in the principal case, in deciding that the law of the place of
the check at the time of the transfer governed the validity of the-transfer,
undoubtedly applied the correct conflicts of law rule. The trans'fer of the
chidck or other negotiable instrument creates a separate contract from the one
made by the. maker and the payee, and the rights and liabilities created by the
new contract between the transferor and transferee are governed by the law
of the place where such transfer is made.9 Since by the law of Jugoslavia a
bona fide purchased for value without notice of the forgery acquired good
title to the check and the rights to its proceeds, the bank purchasing the check
acquired all the rights the original payee bad against the United States. The
indorsement to the New York bank gave it the rights the indorsor had as
against the prior holders and the maker. The New York Guaranty Trust
Company, having obtained good title to the check, would be entitled to retain
the proceeds paid to it by the federal reserve bank.
The Supreme Court in saying, "under established principles of conflicts
of law, adopted by both federal and state courts, the validity of the transfer
of a chattel brought into the country by the consent of the owner is gov-
erned by its law; and that rule applies to negotiable instruments" seems to
infer that if the check were taken into Jugoslavia without the consent of the
owner, the law of the District of Columbia would apply. Some cases do make
this distinction,' 0 and it seems to be a valid one, because by such consent the
owner subjects himself to the law of the state into which the chattel is taken.
C. L. C.
Constitutional Law-Chain Store License Tax As Applicable To Gasoline
Filling Stations. The legislature of West Virginia passed a law whereby all
persons and corporations operating or maintaining a store as therein' defined
were required to obtain an annual license from the state tax commissioner.
The license fee was graduated according to the number of stores. The re-
sult was to cast upon the complainant and competing chains in the same
business a much heavier burden than that borne by others in the same
business. The complainant took the position that the taxes were illegal,
first, because the gasoline stations were not stores within the meaning of the
statute, and, second, because even though they were, the imposition of such a
tax was a denial to the complainant of the immunities secured by the equal
protection clause of the United States and State Constitutions. The district
court decided that the tax constituted a denial to the complainant of the equal
protection of the laws and also that gasoline stations were not stores within
the meaning of the statute. The decree enjoined the payment of the con-
tested fees into the treasury and ordered restitution. The case was appealed
to the Supreme Court of the United States. Held, that gasoline filling
stations are stores or mercantile establishments within the meaning of the
statute and that statute does not deny to the complainant the equal protection
of the laws.'
The court decides that a gasoline filling station falls within the genus,
"store", or within the summum genus, "mercantile establishment", apparently
on the ground that gasoline, automobile accessories and other petroleum
9 Embirocos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank (1905), 1 K. B. Div. 677; Weissman v.
Banque de Bruxelles (1930), 254 N. Y. 488, 173 N. E. 885.
10 Lees v. Harding, Whitman & Co. (1905), 68 N. J. Eq. 622, 60 Atl. 352; Sargent
v. Usher (1875), 55 N. H. 287. It is to be noted, however, that the American Law
Irstitute Restatement of Conflicts makes no such distinction.
' Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey (1935), 55 Sup. Ct. 333.
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products are goods, wares or merchandise. By a statute of West Virginia,2
"store shall be construed to mean and include any store or stores or any,
mercantile establishment or establishments which are owned, operated, main-
tained and/or controlled by the same person, firm, corporation, copartner-
ship, or association, either domestic or foreign, in which goods, wares or
merchandise of any kind, are sold, either at retail or wholesale." The iden-
tical definition exists in the Indiana statute3 and also in the Florida statute,4
except for one difference in the latter. The Florida statute has an added
provision which states, "the term 'store' shall not include filling stations en-
gaged exclusively in the sale of gasoline or other petroleum products". The
case of Gunther v. Atlantic Refining Co.5 holds that a gasoline station is a
store (in the absence of a statute). It will be noted that the Florida statute
expressly excludes gasoline stations from the operation of the statute. This
does not necessarily show that the term store would not ordinarily include
gasoline stations, but rather allows an inference to be drawn to the effect
that without the express exclusion, gasoline stations would be included in the
definition as given. The inference would certainly follow that a gasoline
station was a mercantile establishment. In either the legal or the popular
meaning of words, it would be a splitting of hairs to omit the designation,
filling station, from the conception, mercantile establishment. 6
We have now to consider the propriety of a classification distinguishing
chain stores and individual stores for the purpose of taxation. 7 The court
in the present case apparently assumed that such a tax was proper. In a
similar case appealed from Indiana,8 the same court in upholding a similar
statute taxing chain grocery stores stated, "The restriction of the equal
protection of the laws does not compel an iron clad rule of equal taxation nor
prevent variety or differences in the classification of properties, businesses,
trades, callings or occupations".
The equality clause of the United States Constitution, as contained in the
14th amendment thereto, has been construed to grant to all persons equality
before the law in the sense that any state statute which makes an unreasonable
or arbitrary discrimination between different persons, or classes of persons,
may be held to be unconstitutional. 9 It is usually stated that such classifica-
tion must not be capricious or arbitrary but must rest upon some reasonable
difference or distinction. 10 This distinction must be substantial and rational,
2 Acts of West Virginia (1933), C. 36, Sec. 8.
3 Indiana Acts (1929), c. 207, Sec. 8.
4 Laws of Florida (1931 Ex. Sess.), C. 15624, Sec. 8; General Acts of Alabama(1931), Act 369, Sec. 8.
G Gunther v. Atlantic Refining Co. (1923), 277 Pa. 289, 121 Atl. 53; People ex rel
Hodkinson Corp. v. Cantor (1922), 196 N. Y. S. 855, 119 Misc. Rep. 664.
0 Hugh E. Willis, Chain Store Taxation (1931), 7 Ind. L. J. 179.
7 State Bd. of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson (1931), 283 U. S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct.
540; Liggett Co. v. Lee (1933), 288 U. S. 517, 53 Sup. Ct. 481; Liggett Co. v. Baldridge(1928), 278 U. S. 105, 49 Sup. Ct. 57; Great A. and P. Tea Co. v. Maxwell (1930),
199 N. C. 433, 154 S. E. 838; Great A. and P. Tea Co. v. Doughton (1928), 196 N. C.
145, 144 S. E. 701; Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Morrisett (1931), 284 U. S. 584, 52
Sup. Ct. 39.
8 State Bd. of Tax. Commissioners v. Jackson (1931), 283 U. S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct.
540; See also Louisville Gas and Electric Co. v. Coleman (1927), 275 U. S. 87, 96;
Citizens Telephone Co. v. Fuller (1913), 229 U. S. 322.
9 Cincinnati Ry. Co. v.McCullom (1915), 183 Ind. 556, 109 N. E. 206; Kelso v.
Cook (1916), 184 Ind. 173, 110 N. E. 980; Union Sewer-Pipe Co. v. Connelly (1902),
184 U. S. 540.
10 Concordia Fire Insurance Co. v. People of Ill. (1934), 292 U. S. 535, 54 Sup.
Ct 830; Borden's Farm Products v. Baldwin (1934), 55 Sup. Ct. 187; State v. Stan-
dard Oil Co. (1908), 218 Mo. 1, 116 S. W. 902; State Bd. of Tax Commissioners v.
Jackson (1931)., 283 U. S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct. 540; Great A. and P. Tea Co. v. Doughton
(1928), 196 N. C. 145, 144 S. E. 701; Quaker City Cab. Co. v. Pennsylvania (1928),
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not illusory and should have at least some relation to the purpose of the
statute. The principle of equal protection of the laws does not mean that
equal taxation is required but means that unequal taxation must be in accord-
ance with a proper classification. The court relies in the instant case upon
two similar recent cases in deciding as to the propriety of the classification. 1 '
In the Indiana case are enumerated the chief benefits of the chain store sys-
tem, as follows: 1. Quality and quantity buying. 2. Cash buying. 3. Avoid-
ance of oversupply. 4. Cheaper and better advertising. 5. Superior man-
agement and method. It is difficult to see how any or all of these benefits
form any realistic distinction between chain and independent stores, espe-
cially in view of the recent policy of independent merchants to form asso-
ciations by which they are able to secure every one of these supposed points
of difference. The conclusion must be reached that these points do not
constitute substantial differences. 12 A rule that allows states to make any
classifications they choose, however slight, and still comply with the require-
ment of equal protection of the laws is not satisfactory when it allows a
distinction to be drawn between persons in identical occupations.
It is also to be noted that where the chain store question has not been
involved, that similar classifications have not been upheld.14 These recent
decisions favoring chain store taxation have led and will undoubtedly lead to
an increase in such statutes,15 thereby greatly increasing the burden on such
stores. Such statutes indicate a plain intention on the part of legislatures to
discriminate against owners of more than one store. Whether or not such
discrimination is for a worthy purpose seems to be immaterial, 16 as the court
here states, "We deal with power only". However, we must deal with the
fact that the usual standards of classification have been broken down and that
apparently any difference is sufficient to comply with the requirement calling
for the equal protection of the laws. It is a quite evident fact that such a tax
will allow oppression, foster discrimination in protection of a questionable
social interest in the abolition of chain stores, and permit confiscation to the
point of destruction. These statutes base their fees solely on the number of
units and have no regard for the amount of income, amount invested, char-
acter of business, size of units, kind of units, value of units, or the social
interest in better values, lower prices, and more efficient service. If the
chains are oppressive or are monopolistic, the proper procedure for checking
them is not in the guise of a license tax but by the Clayton or Sherman acts.
As to the tax in this case being due process of law, the court upheld it
saying, "What has been said in respect of the contention that the tax has the
effect of an arbitrary discrimination is a sufficient answer to the contention
that property has been taken without due process of law". Without going
277 U. S. 389, 48 Sup. Ct. 553; Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia (1920), 253 U. S. 412,
40 Sup. Ct. 560; Tanner v. Little (1916), 240 U. S. 369, 36 Sup. Ct. 379.
11 State Bd. of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson (1931), 283 U. S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct.
540.
12 Hughes, The taxation of Chain Stores (1932), 10 Chicago-Kent Rev. 107.
13 Becker and Hess, The Chain Store License Tax and the 14th amendment (1929),
7 N. C. L. Rev. 115; State Bd. of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson (1931), 283 U. S. 527,
51 Sup. Ct. 540; Quong Wing v. Kirkendall (1912), 223 U. S. 59, 32 Sup. Ct. 192; Car-
gill Co. v. Minnesota ex rel Ry. and Warehouse Commission (1901), 180 U. S. 452, 21
Sup. Ct. 423.
14 Quaker City Cab. Co. v. Pennsylvania (1928), 277 U. S. 389, 48 Sup. Ct. 553.
15 Keystone Grocery and Tea Co. v. Huster (1927), Md. Alleghany County Cir-
cuit Ct. Equity Case No. 10922 (unreported), Acts of West Virginia (1933), C. 36;
Indiana Acts (1929), C. 207; Laws of Florida (1931 Ex. Sess.), c. 15624; Laws of
Md. (1927), C. 554; 17 Va. L. R. 113; 19 Va. L. Rev. 722.
16 Alaska Fish Co. v. Smith (1921), 255 U. S. 44, 41 Sup. Ct. 219; Magnano Co. v.
Hamilton (1934), 292 U. S. 40, 54 Sup. Ct. 599.
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deeply into this point it is appropriate to note that if this is an exercise, of
the taxing power it must be for a public purpose, and if it is an exercise of
the police power, it must be in support of a sufficient social interest. It is not
expressly stated to be for a public purpose and as has already been stated, it
does not appear that the people have any greater social interest in the pres-
ervation of the independent merchant than they have in the preservation of
chain stores which are of undisputable aid to those in the proletariat class and
also to any of those who trade with them.
J. o. M.
Constitutional Law-Contempt of Senate. Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to review a judgment reversing
a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissing a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus by one who had been arrested by the
Sergeant-at-Arms of the Senate of the United States. The petitioner, Wil-
liam P. MacCracken, Jr., was summoned to appear before the Special Com-
mittee of the Senate for the investigation of all existing contracts entered into
by the Postmaster General for the carriage of air mail and ocean mail, and to
bring all books and papers relating thereto. He appeared but refused to
produce some of the papers under the claim of privileged communications
between clients and himself. The Committee decided that all papers should
be produced despite the claims of privilege, but meanwhile one of the clients
with the permission, and another client without the permission of the petitioner,
but with the permission of his partner, took some of the papers relating to
the contracts and destroyed part of them. The petitioner was then cited for
contempt. The petitioner contends that the Senate is without power to arrest
him with a view to punishing him, because the act complained of was the
"past commission of a completed act which prior to the arrest and the pro-
ceedings to punish had reached such a stage of finality that it could not
longer affect the proceedings of the Senate or any Committee thereof, and
which, and the effects of which had been undone long before the arrest".
Held, the Senate may punish for past contempt in failing to produce evidence,
notwithstanding the evidence was thereafter produced or its production has
become impossible.'
The power of Congress to punish for contempt is primarily a matter of
historical development rather than one of Constitutional interpretation. The
Constitution of the United States is silent upon the subject of punishment for
contempt except as it gives each house power "to punish its members for dis-
orderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member",
but Congress has in numerous instances acted upon the theory that it has
such an auxiliary power.2
The English House of Commons set the example by first exerting the
contempt power and the Colonial Assemblies which were modeled thereon
instituted the practice in America. Through legislative custom the contempt
power came to be recognized as an auxiliary of the legislative power, and was
conferred without specific provision as a matter of course on all legislative
bodies created in early American history. The practice of the Continental
Congress and the State and National Legislative Assemblies fully demon-
strate this growth.3
I Jurney v. MacCracken, Jr.. (1935), 79 L. Ed. 405.
2Willis, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt (1927), 2 Ind.
L. J. 615.
3 Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt (1926), 74 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 828; Willis, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt (1927),
2 Ind. L. J. 615.
